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Abstract
This paper presents a simple condition for optimal asymmetric labour (capi-
tal) taxation/subsidization in a two-sector model with logarithmic utilities and
Cobb-Douglas production functions, linked to demographic factors: fertility rate
and longevity. The paper shows that depending on parameter values, it may
be optimal to tax or subsidize labour in the sectors. If it is optimal to tax
the investment-goods sector, a Pareto-improving tax reform is possible. Larger
output elasticities of capital in the sectors reduce the possibilities of a Pareto-
improving reform, while population ageing in terms of higher longevity enhances
the possibilities of welfare improvement for all generations. Fertility rates do
not affect optimal taxation.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we develop a rule for optimal sector-specific taxation and subsidiza-
tion of production factors in a two-sector, two-overlapping-generation model,
and link it to demographic factors such as longevity and population growth.
The main goal of our paper is to investigate the effects of population ageing on
optimal sector-specific production factors taxation. We find that this taxation
always leads to welfare improvement in the long run and a condition is de-
rived when it is welfare-improving for transitional generations, implying that a
Pareto-improving reform is possible. We show that an increase in longevity pos-
itively affects the optimal tax rate to be levied on the investment-goods sector,
and permits the government to institute welfare-improving taxation. Further-
more, the larger the output elasticities of capital, the smaller the optimal tax
on labour income in the investment-goods sector. Changes in fertility rates do
not affect optimal taxation in the long run.
In one-sector models, the golden rule has been known since the seminal work
of Phelps (1961). This was extended by Cremers (2006) to a two-overlapping-
generation model with two sectors. In this case, the condition is similar to the
standard golden rule in a one-sector model. If capital is overaccumulated rela-
tive to the golden rule, the model exhibits dynamic inefficiency, leading to the
possibility of a welfare improving reform. If the economy is dynamically efficient
- agents’ savings and, hence, capital accumulation are not optimal either, but
a Pareto-improving reform is not possible, since it causes losses at least for one
transitional generation.
Economies are usually not in their golden rules, because individuals, which
make savings-consumption decisions, consider macroeconomic factors as given.
They do not take into account that their savings may have an effect on the
total capital amount in the economy. But, in the general equilibrium, agents’
savings determine capital-labour ratios, and, therefore, produce externalities on
other agents. As a result, agents’ savings/consumption decisions are, in general,
far from optimal. In a two-sector model, agents also make other decisions:
they choose sectors for working and investment. Definitely, they make these
decisions thinking over their own incomes only, and not taking into account
that their decisions may have general equilibrium effects. As a result, allocation
of production factors between sectors may be far from optimal too. Moreover, in
the model with two sectors, agents also produce another source of externalities:
agents’ decisions in which sector to work affect returns to capital in the sectors
and price of consumption goods, producing an externality on the current old
generation. This type of externality is not present in the standard one-good
models, consequently we derive a different optimality condition.
Savings are determined by agents’ intertemporal allocation of consumption,
and they may be suboptimal. In a two-sector model, where consumption and
investment goods are produced, agents’ desire to save determines demand for
the investment goods; but savings are limited by supply, which in turn depends
on agents’ decisions in which sector to work and to invest. As supply of invest-
ment goods is equal to demand, suboptimal savings also lead to a suboptimal
2
allocation of production factors between the sectors. The reverse link also holds:
if factors’ allocation between the sectors is suboptimal - agents’ savings, and,
hence, consumptions are suboptimal too. The goal of this paper is to explore this
reverse link. We derive a condition for optimality different from the standard
golden rule.
Two-sector models with investment and consumption goods were first in-
troduced by Uzawa (Uzawa 1961; Uzawa 1963) who showed that steady state
growth exists, and that the system starting at any initial capital and labour
values approaches this steady growth. Galor (1992) extended the Uzawa model
with overlapping generations, and found sufficient conditions for a globally-
unique equilibrium in a very general setting. In a similar model, Venditti (2005)
noted a saddle-point equilibrium stability if the steady state is unique.
The relevant literature also includes Selim (2009, 2010, 2011) who analyzed
an optimal taxation of labour and capital in three different settings, all with sim-
ilar results. Selim found that it is optimal to impose capital-income tax in the
investment-goods sector, and diverse labour-income taxes in the consumption-
goods sector. The need for differentiated labour taxation in his model arises
only in order to undo inefficiencies caused by asymmetric capital taxation. The
main difference between Selim’s and our model is that we study optimal tax-
ation accounting for general equilibrium effects, whilst Selim finds optimality
conditions with respect to taxes, keeping factor prices fixed. The need for dis-
similar labour taxation in our model comes directly from the diverse nature of
the goods produced in the sectors: consumption goods directly affect agents’
utilities, but they cannot be invested, whereas investment goods cannot be con-
sumed, and do not directly affect utility functions. But a larger amount of
investment goods increases capital-labour ratios in the next period, increasing
production of consumption goods, which in turn affect agents’ utilities. As a
result, under some parameter values it is optimal to tax labour in one sector and
subsidize it in another, while under other parameter values an optimal policy
may require the opposite. We derive a precise condition for optimal taxation.
Muro (2013) studied optimal taxation of returns to labour and capital in a
two-sector general equilibrium model and found that the optimal tax rate on
capital income is positive; though Muro did not differentiate taxation between
sectors. Unlike Muro (2013) we do not consider capital and labour taxation
together, but impose sector-specific labour taxes. In appendix we also present
results for a sector-specific capital taxation. Rothschild and Scheuer (2013) also
examined optimal taxation in a model with a few sectors. They showed that
self-selection into occupational sectors requires less progressive taxes if there are
several complementary sectors in an economy.
Apart of asymmetric taxation our model also features population ageing. Ef-
fects of population ageing in two-sector general equilibrium models were studied
earlier in the literature. For example, Sayan (2005) developed a model with two
sectors, two overlapping generations and two countries to study the effects of
population ageing. He found that in this setting, international trade might not
be Pareto-superior to autarky. Naito and Zhao (2009) updated Sayan’s results
showing that, although uncompensated free trade is not Pareto-superior to au-
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tarky, the gains and losses can be redistributed between the counties so that
free trade becomes Pareto-welfare improving. Yakita (2012) has also examined
a two-sector model with population ageing. He extended Sayan’s 2 × 2 × 2
model adding endogenous fertility, and showed that in such a setting, popula-
tion ageing in terms of higher life expectancy does not necessarily induce the
export of capital intensive goods from the country. Furthermore, like Sayan, he
found that a switch from autarky to an open economy may not lead to welfare
improvement. This case would depend on whether the country becomes a net
exporter or importer of capital-intensive goods, because longer retirement re-
duces number of children, and leads to a smaller demand of consumption goods.
The key difference between these models and our own is the question we aim
to address. Sayan, Naito and Zhao and Yakita studied the macroeconomic ef-
fects of asymmetric population ageing on international trade and the effects of
a switch from autarky to free international trade. We extend their models with
an asymmetric taxation, and study effects of population ageing on it.
This paper is organized as follows: The next section develops the model and
discusses its basic properties. In section 3 a condition for optimal taxation is
derived. Section 4 presents a numerical example. Finally, section 5 concludes.
2 The model
We employ a discrete-time Samuelson-Diamond overlapping generations model
(Samuelson 1958; Diamond 1965) extended by Galor (1992) with two sectors.
There are two overlapping generations and two sectors in the model. One sector
(C) produces consumption goods, which can be consumed only, and not stored or
invested. Another sector (I) produces investment goods, which can be invested,
but not consumed (physical capital). Production factors, labour and capital,
are perfectly mobile between the sectors. The general structure of the model is
visualised in Figure 1.
We will focus on a labour taxation. In appendix, an asymmetric capital tax-
ation, and asymmetric value added taxes (VAT) are analysed. Optimal capital
taxation is qualitatively the same as labour taxation in terms of effects con-
cerned with all the variables. The case of value added taxes is slightly different,
because taxation/subsidization of labour in one sector may lead to subsidiza-
tion/taxation of capital in another sector. As young agents supply labour and
old generations own the capital, asymmetric value added taxes may lead to an
intergenerational reallocation of wealth.
2.1 Firms
Denote output, capital stock and labour employed in sector x (x ∈ {C, I}) as
Yx(t), Kx(t) and Lx(t). The time is discrete. Firms produce investment and
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Figure 1: General structure of the model
consumption goods using a standard Cobb-Douglas technology:
YC(t) = K
α
C(t)L
1−α
C (t), (1)
YI(t) = K
β
I (t)L
1−β
I (t), (2)
where α and β are parameters 0 < α, β < 1. Wages and interest rates are equal
to the marginal returns to labour and capital and they are nominated in terms
of consumption goods:
wC(t) = (1− α)kαC(t), (3)
wI(t) = (1− β)p(t)kβI (t), (4)
1 + rC(t) =
α
p(t− 1)k
α−1
C (t), (5)
1 + rI(t) =
βp(t)
p(t− 1)k
β−1
I (t). (6)
Where kx(t) = Kx(t)/Lx(t), x ∈ {I, C} are capital-labour ratios. Interest rates
are divided by the price of capital goods in period t−1: p(t−1), because agents
choosing to invest, use their wage incomes expressed in terms of consumption
goods to buy investment goods.
2.2 Households
Agents maximize a two-period, log-linear utility function:
U(t) = logCyx(t) +
ψ
1 + ρ
logCox(t+ 1), x ∈ {C, I}, (7)
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where Cyx denotes consumption when young, C
o
x is consumption in the second
period of life, ρ is a discount factor, ψ ∈ [0, 1] is the probability of surviving
before the second period of life. This parameter corresponds to longevity.
We assume that annuity markets are perfect, i.e. if a person passes away
before his second period of life, his savings are equally redistributed amongst
the surviving agents of the same generation, making the real returns to savings
equal to 1 +Rx(t) = (1 + rx(t))/ψ.
The budget constraints are:
Cyx(t) = wx(t)(1− τx)− sx(t), (8)
Cox(t) = (1 +Rx(t))sx(t), x ∈ {C, I}, (9)
where τx, x ∈ {C, I} is a sector specific tax on labour income. The tax can be
negative, representing a subsidy. The maximization problem gives the following
expression for savings:
sx(t) =
ψwx(t)(1− τx)
1 + ρ+ ψ
, x ∈ {C, I}. (10)
Instead of the presence of annuity markets we may assume that the assets
of agents, who die before their second period of life, are confiscated by the
government and are thrown out of the model, for example, to finance external
debt. In this case, all the qualitative results of the model remain unchanged.
2.3 Equilibrium and Dynamics
The government levies sector-specific taxes on labour incomes: τI and τC .
Agents may freely choose a sector in which to work. Hence, labour market
equilibrium is given as an equality of incomes:
wC(t)(1− τC) = wI(t)(1− τI). (11)
Similarly, capital market equilibrium is described as an equality of interest rates
rI(t) = rC(t) = r(t). Combining capital and labour market equilibria together
we get an expression linking sector-specific capital-labour ratios:
kC(t) =
α(1− β)(1− τI)
β(1− α)(1− τC)kI(t). (12)
As sector specific taxes τI and τC affect the allocation of labour, sector-specific
capital-labour ratios also depend on them. This is an essential difference from
the model developed by Cremers (2006).
Price of investment goods in terms of consumption goods can be calculated
from equations (3)-(4) and (12):
p(t) =
(
1− α
1− β
)1−α(
1− τC
1− τI
)1−α(
α
β
)α
kI(t)
α−β . (13)
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Suppose that the size of the t-th generation is Λ(t) = LI(t) + LC(t), and it
grows at a constant rate n: Λ(t)/Λ(t − 1) = 1 + n. Because of labour market
equilibrium, incomes, and therefore savings in both sectors, are equal; thus,
we omit a sector-specific index for savings. Savings are invested in the capital
market; therefore, total savings are equal to the output of the investment-goods
sector: s(t)Λ(t)/p(t) = YI(t), resulting in:
LI(t)
Λ(t)
=
ψ(1− β)(1− τI)
1 + ρ+ ψ
. (14)
This is an investment good market clearing condition.
One interesting observation is that the allocation of labour between the
sectors depends on the tax rate in the investment-goods sector, and not on the
tax in the consumption-goods sector. Furthermore, output elasticity of capital
in the investment goods sector β affects the allocation of labour, and α does
not. This finding recalls the results of Jensen (2003), who showed in a slightly
different framework without overlapping generations, but with more general
production and utility functions, that long-run growth of capital-labour ratios
(and, hence, income) decisively depends on the technology parameters of the
investment-goods sector, while technology parameters of the consumption-goods
sector do not play a significant role in economic growth. Equation (14) also
implies that labour immediately reallocates between the sectors when taxation
of the investment-goods sector is changed.
Capital depreciates in one period;2 therefore, the amount of capital in the
economy is equal to the total savings made in the previous period, which in turn
are limited by the output of investment goods in the economy.
KC(t) +KI(t) = YI(t− 1). (15)
implying that
kI(t) =
kβI (t− 1)
1 + n
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1− τC)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)]−1
. (16)
Equations (14) and (16) determine the dynamics of the model. Dynamic
equation (14) resembles the models with an unstable equilibrium - when, after
a structural change, the model immediately jumps to a new steady state; it is
however, much simpler. The capital-labour ratio dynamics described by (16) are
analysed in Figure 2. As the figure implies, there are two equilibrium points.
The equilibrium k∗I = 0 is unstable and irrelevant for policy analysis. The other
equilibrium is described by equation (17). This is an internal stable equilibrium.
k∗β−1I = (1 + n)
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1− τC)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)]
, (17)
2A more general but less intuitive case, allowing for an incomplete capital depreciation, is
described in the appendix.
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Figure 2: kI(t) dynamics
where k∗I stands for a steady-state value of the capital-labour ratio. Equation
(17) gives an exact equilibrium capital-labour ratio in the investment-goods
sector.
2.4 Government
We suppose that the government’s budget is balanced, and taxes collected in
one of the sectors are redistributed in the form of subsidies for people working
in another sector: LCwCτC = −LIwIτI . Using labour-market equilibrium this
equality can be rewritten as
τC = − τIψ(1− β)
1 + ρ+ βψ
. (18)
Thus, a positive tax in one of the sectors leads to a negative tax (positive
subsidy) in another sector.
3 Optimality
Government would prefer tax rate τI so that agents would achieve larger utilities
in equilibrium. Substituting τC in equation (17) with (18), k
∗
I can be expressed
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through parameters and τI only. Hence, p in equation (13) and, hence, con-
sumptions in (8-9) can be expressed through the parameters and τI :
Cy =
(1− α)1−α
(1 + n)
α
1−β
(
α(1− β)
β
)α
(1 + ρ)(1− τI)α
(1 + ρ+ ψ)
(
1 +
τIψ(1− β)
1 + ρ+ βψ
)1−α
×
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1 + τIψ(1−β)1+ρ+βψ )
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)]− α1−β
, (19)
Co = ((1− α)β)1−α(1 + n) 1−α−β1−β (α(1− β)(1− τI))
α
(1 + ρ+ ψ)
(
1 +
τIψ(1− β)
1 + ρ+ βψ
)1−α
×
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1 + τIψ(1−β)1+ρ+βψ )
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)] 1−α−β
1−β
. (20)
Plugging equations (19-20) into (7) we maximize the utilities of agents work-
ing in sector I with respect to τI . Maximization of YC , with respect to τI leads to
simpler computations, but the same result. The same is also valid when capital
is taxed instead of labour. However, in the appendix, where VAT are studied,
maximizations of YC and agents’ utilities give different results because VAT af-
fects agents’ income twice: first, labour income, when young, second, capital
income, when old. As a result, there is also an intergenerational reallocation
of income. As agents are mobile across the sectors, the other sector’s utility
function is maximized as well. Observe that due to the logarithmic form of the
utility function, population growth n will not affect optimal taxation. Some
cumbersome computations are needed,3 but by equalizing the corresponding
derivative to zero, the expression can be significantly simplified, resulting in the
optimal tax rate equal to
τ∗I =
1− α− β − α(1 + ρ)/ψ
1− β . (21)
Depending on parameter values, labour in sector I may need to be taxed
or subsidized in order to reach the optimal allocation of the production fac-
tors in equilibrium. The larger the output elasticities of capital α and β, the
smaller the optimal tax or the larger the optimal subsidy for sector I. This is
because a larger concentration of resources in the investment-goods sector leads
to a larger amount of capital in the following period, which increases outputs
in both sectors. If capital plays a minor role in production, it is optimal to tax
the investment-goods sector, to increase the production of consumption goods.
Greater longevity ψ enhances τ∗I . Indeed, it leads to larger savings and increased
demand for investment goods; but greater demand for investment-goods is out-
weighed by a larger demand for consumption goods in the second period of
3Optimization was performed with Maple, and the corresponding file is presented in the
online appendix on the author’s web page.
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life. Young agents are more interested in increasing their own savings, without
taking into account the needs of the old generation, thus underproducing con-
sumption goods. Therefore, greater longevity leads to larger optimal taxes on
the investment-goods sector. Higher discount rate ρ reduces optimal taxes or
increases subsidies in sector I, because, with high ρ, agents save not sufficiently
for an optimal amount of capital in the economy. Fertility rate n does not affect
the optimal taxation.
Another interesting point can be observed in equation (21): Suppose that
initially τI = τC = 0. If τ
∗
I > 0, and the government decides to tax the
investment-goods sector at the rate τ∗I , and subsidize the consumption-goods
sector; this can be easily implemented: reallocation of the production factors
to the consumption-goods sector increases the number of consumption-goods in
the economy and, as a result, agents living at the time of reform may consume
more, obtaining larger utilities immediately after the reform is implemented.
However, if τ∗I < 0, and the government sets τI = τ
∗
I , reallocation of mo-
bile production factors to the investment-goods sector reduces production of
the consumption-goods in the short run, leading to a decline in utilities of the
transitional generations. This effect resembles a familiar property of dynamic
(in)efficiency discussed in detail by Cremers (2006); however, the condition is
different. In the next subsection we will compare these optimality conditions in
more detail, and we will return to the welfare effects of transitional generations
later.
3.1 Interest rates
Analysing welfare effects, it is important to find out how interest rates change.
Economic literature usually assumes that r > 0, since, if agents store, the
amount of goods they obtain in the following period is greater than if those
goods had been invested. In our model, annuities also matter, as they change
real returns to savings. Furthermore, consumption goods cannot be stored for
one period, which amounts to approximately 35 years, and investment goods
fully depreciate as well. Agents, therefore, must invest a part of their savings
in any case, if they wish to consume in the second period of their lives. Indeed,
the case of r < 0 does not seem unrealistic, since, investments in stocks are
risky, and agents may never know if they win or lose. Investments in bonds are
risky as well, since real returns depend on inflation, and, in general, they can
be negative. As our model is deterministic with perfect foresight, agents in the
model need not distinguish between stocks and bonds; if they receive positive or
negative returns to savings depends on the parameter values. Indeed, plugging
equation (18) and (21) into (17) and equation (17) into (6) we get:
r∗ =
αρn+ βψn+ αn+ αψ + αρ+ βψ + α− ψ
(1− α)ψ . (22)
With different parameter values r may be positive or negative. Using equa-
tion (22) it is possible to rewrite equation (21) in the following way:
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τ∗I = −r∗
1− α
1− β +
n(αρ+ βψ + α)
(1− β)ψ . (23)
This gives us a more intuitive explanation of optimal taxation. If population
growth n is equal to zero, the investment-goods sector should be taxed when
the interest rate is negative (hence, an excess of capital in the economy), and
subsidised when the net interest rate is positive (lack of capital in the economy).
The second term of this equation corrects for population growth. As the interest
rate depends on population growth (equations (17) and (6)) and τ∗I does not
depend, the presence of the second term removes this dependence.
As already mentioned, the introduction of τ∗I > 0 may be Pareto-improving.
From equation (23) it follows immediately that τ∗I > 0 if
r∗ <
n(αρ+ βψ + α)
ψ(1− α) . (24)
Cremers (2006) showed that the economy is dynamically inefficient when
r∗ < n (keeping depreciation rate equal to 1). From the literature we know that
in this case a Pareto-improving reform is possible: if young agents are taxed, and
the taxes are reallocated to the old generation in the form of pension benefits,
this leads to a Pareto improvement. Taxes for the young and pension benefits
for the old - reduce savings, which lowers capital-labour ratios, and increases
interest rates, thus the golden rule can be achieved (r∗ = n). The condition
(24) differs from the property of dynamic inefficiency. Larger values of output
elasticities of capital α and β make condition (24) more likely to be satisfied
than the condition for dynamic inefficiency; the opposite holds when they are
small. When condition (24) is satisfied, a Pareto-improving reform is possible
via asymmetric taxation. It is explained in more detail in the next section.
The are two factors, which cause suboptimal allocations of production fac-
tors. First of all, agents’ choices in which sector to work and to invest determine
the amounts of goods produced, and, hence, capital-labour ratios in the next
period. As a consequence, agents produce externalities for the future genera-
tion, and also on the agents form the same generation in the next period, since
capital-labour ratios directly affect interest rates. This factor is intuitively sim-
ilar to the property of dynamic (in-)efficiency. There is also another source
of externality: the old receive returns on capital both from investment and
consumption good sectors; as the old are interested in consumption only (not
investment), they are interested in a lower price of consumption goods. The
allocation of young agents between the sectors determines the supply of the
goods, and this have an important effect on the price of goods, interest rates
and welfare of the old. This source of externalities is not present in one-good
models. Consequently, we derived a different optimality condition.
Intertemporal allocation of consumption determines demand for investment
and consumption goods. Allocation of agents and capital between the sectors
determines the supply side. As supply is equal to demand, agents’ subopti-
mal decisions for demand (dynamic efficiency/inefficiency property) also affect
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agents’ (and capital’s) allocation between the sectors, and the other way around:
suboptimal allocation of production factors between the sectors affects intertem-
poral allocation of consumption. There is a link between these two sources of
inefficiencies, but they are not exactly the same. Sometimes it is easier to
correct the intertemporal allocation of resources, and sometimes intratemporal
allocation can be readjusted.
Technically, the difference between our condition and Cremers’ is that, in
our model, τI affects the agents’ present values of life-time incomes not only
via capital-labour ratios but also directly: wI(1 − τI). If this were not the
case, the maximisation problem with respect to τI would be ∂U(·, τI)/∂τI =
∂U(k(τI))/∂τI = [∂U(k(τI))/∂k(τI)][∂k(τI)/∂τI ] = 0. ∂k(τI)/∂τI can be can-
celed resulting in ∂U(kI)/∂kI = 0 - an optimality condition discussed in details
by Cremers’. That τI directly affects the term wI(1 − τI) complicates things,
yielding a condition for the possibility of a Pareto improvement different from
the property of dynamic inefficiency. It is interesting to note that when pop-
ulation growth is equal to zero (and depreciation rate is equal to unity), both
conditions coincide.
Agents make saving-consumption decisions not taking into account that their
choices may have general equilibrium effects. Namely, demand for investment
and consumption goods determines the relative sizes of the sectors, which affect
capital-labour ratios and the welfare of the agents in the following period. As
a result, the allocation of labour between sectors may be inefficient, though
asymmetric labour taxation can be used as an instrument to overcome these
inefficiencies.
4 Numerical example
In this section, two numerical examples are presented to illustrate the welfare
effects in both cases: when τ∗I > 0 and τ
∗
I < 0. For this reason, we have chosen
parameter values commonly reported in the literature. The annual discount
factor is often chosen to be close to 1% (Bo¨rsch-Supan, Ludwig, and Winter
2006; Adema, Meijdam, and Verbon 2008). In our model, as the period is
approximately equal to 35 years, the discount factor corresponds to ρ = 0.4166.
Population size at t = 0 is normalized to unity and population growth n is set to
0.2, this approximately corresponds to 0.5% annual growth of population due to
fertility. Longevity ψ here means a survival probability before the next period,
and it is presumed to be close to 1 (see Adema et al. (2008), for example). We
set it at 0.9. Regarding the output elasticities of capital, these are generally
estimated at the 0.3 level or slightly higher (Maddison 1987). We suppose that
the investment-goods sector is more capital intensive, thus, we set β = 0.4, and
consider two cases for α: α = 0.2, and α = 0.3. We consider these two cases
since α = 0.2 results in τ∗I > 0, and α = 0.3 in τ
∗
I < 0.
Initially τI = τC = 0. In period t = 0 the government unexpectedly imple-
ments a fiscal reform, setting τI = τ
∗
I , and τC = τ
∗
C as derived in equations (18)
and (21).
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Figure 3: Utility
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Figure 3 presents the life-time utilities of agents. The horizontal axis corre-
sponds to the period when a generation was born. Agents are perfectly mobile
between the sectors; therefore, we do not need to distinguish between them. As
previously mentioned, in the case of α = 0.2, τI is positive; therefore, at t = 0
agents migrate from sector I to sector C. A decline of labour in the investment-
goods sector tends to reduce marginal return to capital in sector I, but increases
it in sector C, creating incentives for capital flow to sector C. But, the capital
flow is not as large as in one-good models (Geide-Stevenson 1998), because of
a price effect: labour outflow raises the cost of investment goods in terms of
consumption goods (equation 13), raising the interest rate and reducing capital
outflow from sector I. Indeed, capital allocation adjusts as well, but to a lesser
degree than in one-good models. The price increase of investment goods leads to
higher interest rates after the reform (nominated in consumption goods), and,
thus, the consumption of the generation born at t = −1 increases when they
are old, leading to a rise in their utilities. The other generations are better off
as well.
In the case when α = 0.3, τI < 0; therefore, agents reallocate to the in-
vestment goods sector, leading to a decline in interest rates and losses for the
generation born at t = −1. As production of consumption goods declines at
t = 0, the generation born at t = 0 is worse off as well. At t = 1, agents
enjoy a larger amount of capital in the economy; however, it is not sufficient to
make them better off relative to the initial equilibrium. For the given parameter
values, only the generations born at t ≥ 2 are better off. In fact, the benefits
accruing to future generations are not sufficient to compensate the losses of
the first transitional generations. This property resembles the results of Breyer
(1989) and Verbon (1989), who showed that gains of a switch from PAYG to
a more-funded pension scheme are not sufficient to reimburse the losses of the
transitional generations if the economy is dynamically efficient.
Two panels of figure 3 raise a question what happens between these two
values of alpha. It follows from equation (21) that when α = ψ(1−β)/(1+ψ+ρ),
τ∗I = 0; therefore, labour is allocated efficiently in this case with no need for
government intervention. Figure 4 shows a 3-d dependence of utility on α. It
shows that the transition of agents’ utilities depends on whether α is smaller of
greater than this certain value.
Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) showed that labour shares in production
outputs are declining worldwide, raising output elasticities of capital. As per
equation (21) and the numerical examples, high output elasticities of capital
make implementation of a Pareto-optimal sector-specific taxation impossible.
Therefore, policymakers should not delay considering the possibility of such a
reform, since, the positive dynamics of size in the output elasticities of capital
may continue, thus making a Pareto-efficient reform impossible. Another inter-
esting feature is that population ageing in terms of greater longevity (larger ψ)
enhances τ∗I and, hence, augments possibilities for Pareto-improving taxation.
An example of such an asymmetric labour taxation can be various tax al-
lowances and exemptions for personal income tax (PIT) in agriculture. Accord-
ing to the Euromod country reports 2009-2013, such allowances and exemptions
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Figure 4: Utility
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exist in Bulgaria, Germany and Luxemburg. In Ireland, PIT exemptions exist
for writers, composers, visual artists and sculptors. But, an asymmetric labour
taxation is not usual. However, sector specific VAT is very common. For exam-
ple, sector-specific VAT rates are applied in Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland,
France and many other countries. We have analysed labour taxation; indeed,
the same logic can also be applied for VAT, however, the results are much more
complicated, since sector-specific value added taxes not only lead to a intersec-
toral reallocation of production factors, but also leads to an intergenerational
reallocation, since a tax on labour collected in one sector, may return as a
subsidy on capital in another sector (see appendix).
We have noted optimal sector-specific taxation rates assuming specific pro-
duction and utility functions. The model can be generalized employing a CES
production and/or utility function or an Epstein-Zin utility function (Epstein
and Zin 1989) if the number of overlapping generations is enlarged. We expect
that such generalizations of the model would also generalize the condition for
optimal taxation, which would depend on the generalized functions’ parameters.
The model also can be extended with a more realistic overlapping-generation
structure, labour market imperfections, bequests, and a large number of other
factors.
5 Conclusions
In this paper we derived a condition for optimal sector-specific labour taxation,
which maximizes agents’ utilities in the steady state. Depending on specific pa-
rameter values, the investment-goods sector should be taxed and consumption-
goods sector subsidized, or viceversa. If the optimal tax on the investment goods
sector is positive - an introduction of such a tax is Pareto-improving, based on
the assumption that labour and capital are freely mobile between the sectors. If
it is optimal to tax the consumption-goods sector, a few transitional generations
will be worse off. Larger output elasticities of capital in the sectors reduce the
possibilities of a Pareto-improving taxation. Yet, population ageing in terms of
greater longevity enhances possibilities of such taxation.
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Appendix
Capital taxation
In case when capital is taxed instead of labour, real interest rate, which affects
consumption when old (equation 9) changes: 1 +Rx(t) = (1 + rx(t))(1− τx)/ψ,
x ∈ {I, C}; labour market equilibrium is given by an equality of wages in the
sectors: (1 − α)kαC = p(t)(1 − β)kβI ; capital market equilibrium is given by an
equality of net capital incomes: αkα−1C (t)(1− τ˜C) = p(t)βkβ−1C (t)(1− τ˜I), where
τ˜x, x ∈ {I, C} denote sector-specific taxes. Dividing labour market equilibrium
by capital market equilibrium we get
kC(t) =
α(1− β)(1− τ˜C)
β(1− α)(1− τ˜I) kI(t). (25)
Equation for savings (10) changes to
sx(t) =
ψwx(t)
1 + ρ+ ψ
, x ∈ {C, I}, (26)
leading to a different expression for share of agents working in the investment-
good sector:
LI(t)
Λ(t)
=
ψ(1− β)
1 + ρ+ ψ
. (27)
Equalizing total savings in the economy to the amount of capital, we get an
expression for capital-labour ratio in sector I:
k∗β−1I = (1 + n)
[
1 +
α(1− τ˜I)
β(1− α)(1− τ˜I)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− 1 + β
)]
. (28)
Expression for government budget balance (18) changes as well. Now govern-
ment budget is balanced when KC(1 + rC)τ˜C = −KI(1 + rI)τ˜I , implying that
τ˜C = − τ˜Iψ(1− α)β
(1 + ρ+ βψ)α
. (29)
Having derived capital labour ratios and government budget constraint, we solve
for the other variables, and maximize the utility functions, and maximize the
utility functions. This results in the same optimal tax for the investment goods
sector as in (21). The exact optimization is given in the .mws file (Maple) on
the author’s web page. Compared to the case with labour taxation, optimal tax
rate for the investment goods sector does not change; however, taxes for the
consumption goods sector are slightly different (compare equations (18) and
(29))
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Value added taxes
If VAT taxes are analysed instead of labour taxes, equations (1-11) do not
change; however, in equation (9) Rx(t), x ∈ {I, C} changes to 1 + Rx(t) =
(1 + rx(t))(1− τx)/ψ, which does not affect savings.
Capital market equilibrium changes to
αkα−1C (t)(1− τ˜C) = p(t)βkβ−1C (t)(1− τ˜I). (30)
As a result, equation (12) simplifies to
kC(t) =
α(1− β)
β(1− α)kI(t). (31)
Equations (14-15) do not change, but equation (17) changes to
k∗β−1I = (1 + n)
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ(1− τI) − (1− β)
)]
, (32)
Government budget constraint changes to YC(t)τC = −pYIτI resulting in
τC = − ψτI(1− α)
1 + ρ+ βψ + ψτI(α− β) (33)
Having derived capital-labour ratio and government budget constraint, we ex-
press all the other variables of interest. We have two opportunities: to maximize
agents’ utilities with respect to τI directly, or to maximize YC . In contrast to
the cases of separate labour and capital taxation, these two methods do not give
the same results, because agent’s income is taxed/subsidized twice: first it is
taxed/subsidized when young agents receive their wages; next, the income of the
old generation is taxed/subsidized. Therefore, a part of the tax for the young,
working in one sector, returns as a subsidy for the old, invested to another sec-
tor, or vice versa. This produces an intergenerational reallocation of income,
and such a reallocation mechanism affects agents’ utilities in a way different
from separate labour or capital taxation/subsidization.
Indeed, direct maximization of agents’ utilities has not given us an acceptable
analytical solution. But it can be made numerically. For example, for parameter
values used in section 4 we received τI = 10.76%, τC = −4.41% for the case
α = 0.2 and τI = −26.64%, τC = 8.63% when α = 0.3.
The government may choose to maximize YC . Then, the optimization prob-
lem gives τI exactly as in the case of labour taxation (equation 21), and taxes for
consumption taxes are given by equation (33). For the parameter values used
in section 4 this results in τI = 14.20%, τC = −5.84% for the case α = 0.2 and
τI = −11.06%, τC = 5.97% when α = 0.3. Intuitively, it is clear, that if YC is
maximized, the government may reallocate consumption goods with lump-sum
taxes and subsidies in such a way, that consumption of all the agents increases
after an introduction of such a tax, resulting in a higher utilities level.
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General depreciation rate
Suppose that capital depreciates incompletely in one period, and denote its
depreciation rate as δ. Then equations (5-6) change in the following way:
δ + rC(t) =
α
p(t− 1)k
α−1
C (t), (34)
δ + rI(t) =
βp(t)
p(t− 1)k
β−1
I (t). (35)
Furthermore, equation (15) changes to
KC(t) +KI(t) = (1− δ)
(
KC(t− 1) +KI(t− 1)
)
+ YI(t− 1), (36)
leading to a change in the dynamic equation (16):
kI(t− 1)β
kI(t)− k(t− 1)(1− δ)/(1 + n) =
(1 + n)
[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1− τC)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)]
. (37)
A stable equilibrium exists when δ > −n. This condition is very intuitive: The
size of population should not decrease at the rate higher than the rate of capital
depreciation. Then, the corresponding capital-labour ratio can be expressed as
k∗β−1I =
(1 + n)(δ − n)
(1− n) ×[
1 +
α
β(1− α)(1− τC)
(
1 + ρ+ ψ
ψ
− (1− β)(1− τI)
)]
. (38)
Government budget constraint and optimization problem give exactly the same
optimal tax rates as those described by equations (18) and (21) due to the log-
arithmic utility function; however, optimality condition (24) changes. Namely,
equation (23) changes to
r∗ = −δ(1− β)
(1− α) τ
∗
I +
n
(
2βψδ + 2αδ(1 + ρ)− βψ − α(1 + ρ)− βψn− αn(1 + ρ)
ψ(1− α)(1− n)
)
; (39)
therefore, Pareto-optimal taxation is possible when
r∗ < n
(
2βψδ + 2αδ(1 + ρ)− βψ − α(1 + ρ)− βψn− αn(1 + ρ)
ψ(1− α)(1− n)
)
. (40)
Condition (40) simplifies to (24) when δ = 1.
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